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Book Review 
Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin 







P l u t o  P r e s s , 2 8 0  p p 
______________________________________________________ 
 Salim Shahzad's investigative journalism explores the hidden 
tentacles of Al-Qaeda, the book analyzes the modus operandi and 
future plans of its looming lethality as a massive outfit. The author 
reminds his readers about the intelligence and tactics of Al-Qaeda, 
which has outsmarted its enemies on a number of occasions and has 
an exceptional ability to utilize situations in their favor. The book  
unfolds several events that were cleverly orchestrated by Al-Qaeda. 
The author is confident that Al-Qaeda and Taliban cannot be defeated 
with the present policies adopted by US and its allies, although he 
does not provide any suggestions on how this information should be 
used to overwhelm the surge of Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
 
THE MUSLIM RULING ELITES  
 Knowing about the mistrust and the gap that exists between 
the Muslim ruling elites and the people, Al-Qaeda takes full advantage 
of this division. Al-Qaeda plans to unite all Muslim militant outfits 
under the command of Al-Qaeda and to organize them into one 
group, in order to be more effective against the West and the Muslim 
ruling elites. In the post 9/11 world, the Muslim ruling elite and the 
West are considered partners and enemies of Al-Qaeda, and as such 
the recent policy of the Pakistani Janissaries (TTP) is to first target the 
Pakistan Armed forces and then engage with the foreign troops. The 
objective has been to cause the masses to become disenchanted from 
their ruling elite and to engage the state elements against each other. 
In this manner, Al-Qaeda would ease the pressure on them and they 
would be more focused on the global agenda.  
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POLITICS OF WAR AND PEACE 
 Since 9/11, Al-Qaeda has developed a politics of war and 
peace. It maneuvered through peace accords in Pakistan to create an 
enlarged space within which to wage war. It sabotaged the peace              
process many times by war and this remains a never-ending process 
until a final victory can be announced. For that purpose they started 
their hunt for natural leaders and created their fieriest group of                   
Janissaries-the Ibnul Balad (Sons of the Soil). The Pakistani                          
Janissaries/TTP is the most effective weapon of Al-Qaeda and is used 
against their own governments. 
 
THE NEO-TALIBAN  
 Al-Qaeda established the first-ever popular local and fully 
tribally supported 'Al-Qaeda Franchise' in the world. Thus, if in the 
future the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani military                          
establishment were ever to plan reconciliation with the West, this Neo
-Taliban will be there to oppose them and to remind their Afghan 
comrades that the Jihadi agenda does end in Afghanistan, but is set to 
circle around the world. In the meantime, Al-Qaeda could deploy the 
TTP to help break any obstructions erected by Pakistan's government. 
Paradoxically, the enforcement of Islamic law had never been the aim 
of the Neo-Taliban. The Swat showdown in 2007 was not fought  
because the government had refused to comply with the Taliban's 
demand to introduce Sharia Law, it was a bid to set up another smoke 
screen to eradicate the US presence in the region and discourage any 
thoughts of dialogue with the Taliban.  
 According to its new policy, Al-Qaeda doesn’t want to                
confront its enemies directly but wishes instead to use the local people 
against their own governments and NATO. Al-Qaeda is now more a                
manipulator than a militant organization fighting it enemies.                       
According to Al-Qaeda's plan, the Pakistani militants have challenged 
the local tribal authority and systematically destroyed the thousand 
years old customs by replacing them with Salafi and Wahabi ideology. 
Thus the command along tribal lines that once existed is broken. Al-
Qaeda's strategy is to combine all the tribal areas into one unit against 
the old tribal system of the Pakistan government. It eliminated the 
British installed tribal system and the Pakistan Army could not do  
anything to prevent this.  
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SAFE HAVEN 
 Al-Qaeda plans to move into Pakistani tribal areas in order to 
make Pakistan the new theater of war. The author argues that Al-
Qaeda did not originally intend to launch Jihad in Pakistan, but when 
Pakistan sided with America in Afghanistan it was left with a dilemma 
which they resolved by considering Pakistan no less an enemy than 
the Western allies of the US. This policy is evident from the activities 
of TTP, which is continuously targeting the Pakistani state's assets and 
army installations.  
 
ESCALATING THE WAR 
 To overcome the present impasse, Al Qaeda adopted a policy 
of expanding the war beyond Pakistan and Afghanistan. The idea was 
originally the brainchild of one of the fieriest neo-Taliban named Ilyas 
Kashmiri. Ilyas Kashmiri was supposedly killed in the 3rd June 2011 
drone attack.  
 
BEHIND THE SCENES 
  Al-Qaeda and Taliban never held identical objectives.                  
Ironically, the Taliban has always been used as a strategic weapon by 
Al-Qaeda and by Pakistan. Even before the fall of the Afghan                    
Taliban's government in 2001, Al-Qaeda had strong influence over 
Mullah Omer and the Taliban Shura. Its influence grew more after the 
American attack. America seriously underestimated the strength of Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, and therefore it lost the chance to politically 
engage the Taliban. Therefore, Al-Qaeda never thought of                           
reconciliation with the Taliban, which it now seems ready to pursue 
today. Had America dealt with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda with                     
different tools, the resulting situation would have been more in      
American's favor and Al-Qaeda could have been made isolated or 
ousted from Afghanistan.  
 Al-Qaeda does not want peace in the region and does not 
allow the Taliban to be recognized by the world. In other words, if 
peace comes in Afghanistan then Al-Qaeda cannot pursue its global 
agenda of escalating war into the whole of South and central Asia. It is 
believed that the real war theater will begin once the Western coalition 
leaves, because Al-Qaeda doesn’t want to fight with the Western                   
coalition forces. It wants to exhaust the coalition forces and to                   
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preserve its energies for the final blow in the Pakistan battlefield. The 
recent trust deficit and disengagement between America and Pakistan 
is surely celebrated by Al-Qaeda as a victory.  
 
PAKISTAN BEARS THE BRUNT 
 Al-Qaeda’s strategic planning is so impressive that it has               
survived to this day, and many believe that it has become increasingly 
united and threatening. Al-Qaeda appears to have already won the 
battle and has defeated its enemies by outwitting them. It was part of 
the Al-Qaeda peace and war policy to force the Pakistani government 
to make agreements with the Taliban (Shakai 2004 and Sarogha 2005 
and 2006), and this paved the way for Al-Qaeda to penetrate into the 
tribal areas of Pakistan and to establish its strategic presence. As a 
result of the 2006 peace agreement, an unknown amount of money 
was transferred from the Pakistani government vault to the militants; 
at this time the clinical term "foreigners" was used to refer to Al-
Qaeda. Time has already proved that Al-Qaeda is on the winning side. 
The 2006 spring offensive was Al-Qaeda's watershed, and after this 
time Al-Qaeda clearly dominated Pakistan in 2007 and 2008, with the 
expansion of operations into India in late 2008. A theater of war was 
then begun in Chechnya in the year 2010.  
 One of Al-Qaeda's members, Sheikh Essa was given the task 
to preach the need for a war against Pakistan. Al-Qaeda knows that it 
was only because of the Pakistan army that the US had been                          
successful against the Afghan Taliban. He visited all the tribal areas 
and convinced the tribal groups that their suffering is because of             
Pakistan. He even went to the extent of saying that those who crossed 
the border to fight against the US in Afghanistan were deviants, and 
that the real battle had to be fought against Pakistan's ruling military 
establishment. On the other hand, America thinks of Pakistan not 
only as a sanctuary to Taliban, but also as a problem for the US and 
considers Pakistan's tribal areas the root cause of insurgency. Pakistan 
seems to be in great trouble from all the sides. 
 
IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION 
 The global Jihadi organizations actions and activities are 
mostly inspired from the political philosophy of the 14th century                
ideologue Ibna-Taymmiyaa (1263–1328 CE) whose beliefs were               
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popular for the next 1000 years. Tamiyyah was considered the model 
of ideological resistance in the Muslim world, and his ideas are still the 
direct source for Islamic revolutionaries. Tamiyyah aimed to shock 
deviants by declaring them non-Muslims. Al-Qaeda's                           
ideological discourse starts with the interpretations of Tamiyyah and 
end with Syed Qutb; their extremist actions are further supported by 
the more recent work of Abdul Wahab Najadi (1703-1792 AD) Shah 
Wali Ullah (1703 –1762) Mawududi (1903-1979) and Syed Qutab 
(1906-1966). Al-Qaeda ideology is further strengthened and                      
radicalized with the recent inclusion of "Takfiri" ideology in its                  
paradigm. The author clarifies the internal hierarchy of Al-Qaeda's 
leadership and its influence on the organization. Al-Zawahiri is                
considered to be the strategic mind and the real ideologue of Al-
Qaeda. As far as Osama was concerned his role was more of a                       
spiritual figurehead than as a true leader of Al-Qaeda. This shows that 
the death of Bin-Laden does not necessarily create an internal fissure 
in the organization; instead, the organization may have become more 
lethal with the death of Bin-Laden.  
 
THE INSIDERS 
 The author very daringly investigates the Pakistani            
army officers who had sympathies with the militants and close                   
ideological links with Al-Qaeda. This cadre of officers was very critical 
of the Pakistan army, and many of them later left the Pakistan army 
and joined Al-Qaeda. The author describes a few inside stories of   
former army officers who joined the militants. One of the stories was 
of two officer-ranked brothers; Capt Khurram (killed) and Maj,              
Haroon who had fought in the Kargil war in 1999 and often referred 
to the cowardice of the Pakistani officers. He was convinced that the 
Pakistan army was incapable of fighting any major battle and had left 
the Pakistan army and joined Al-Qaeda. He was responsible for 
spreading several gruesome operations. The author describes the                   
likelihood of more Al-Qaeda sympathizers currently within the                   
Pakistan Army, and has given much detail about the so-called secret 
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THE END GAME 
 Saleem Shahzad believes that the defeat of the Western                 
coalition is imminent, but he rules out the possibility of a nuclear Al-
Qaeda supported by Muslims states. Instead, he argues that Al-
Qaeda's real strength is not its weaponry but its uncanny ability to 
exploit unfolding events by working towards the collapse of its hi-tech 
enemies. Shahzad ends with this stating that the current approach and 
strategy that has been adopted by the Western coalition to eliminate 
Al-Qaeda can never be successful, but does not suggest any strategy 
himself that could be effective against Al-Qaeda. After a span of ten 
years, it is much evident that America has made many miscalculations 
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